This paper studies contracting externalities in an adverse selection two-period framework. The principal can delay dealing with her agent until the second period to obtain some information. The information comes from the contracting of another principal and agent. Thus, there are informational externalities between two pairs "principal-agent".
Introduction
This paper studies contracting in an adverse selection framework when the principal can delay a production to obtain some information. The information concerns the type of the agent and it comes from the contracting of another principal-agent pair. Therefore, contracting of each pair has informational externalities on the other pair. The following example illustrates what I have in mind. 1 There are two European countries. In each of them there is a regulator that wants to reform some local monopoly, say, railways. The local monopolies have some private information that is important for the reform, for instance, the true costs, the eagerness of the management to reform or something else that the regulator is not aware about before the beginning of the reform. This information is likely to be correlated between the two national monopolies. Then, even if the reform is needed as soon as possible, each regulator might wish to postpone the reform and to observe the experience of the other country.
I study this trade-off between contracting now under poor information or later under a better information. Putting it differently, the focus of this paper is the delay that arises as a function of the endogenously generated information. I look at the particular case when the firms do not have any direct relation, horizontal (competitors in the same market) or vertical (supplier and customer). In other words, contracting with one firm generates a purely informational externality on the other. I develop a model with two pairs "principal-agent". In each pair the principal contracts with her agent in a two-type adverse selection Baron-Myerson framework. There are two periods and production is needed in either the first or the second period. This is a depart from the standard dynamic agency models like Tirole (1987, 1990) but an extension of bargaining models as, for example, Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1987) where the seller does not propose a menu but only one (quantity, price) pair. I could possibly reformulate the model so that the agent produces each period. However, then it is not clear what delay means. It might be that the delay can be interpreted as pooling in the first period in such a model. But it seems that the effect of informational externalities will not be as clear-cut as in the present setting.
The agents' types are correlated and each pair can observe to some extent contracting of the other pair which creates informational externalities between the pairs. 2 Information comes from the contracting of other pair "principal-agent" and possibly from some exogenous sources; it becomes available between the two periods. Each principal faces a trade-off between contracting in the first period and contracting in the second period having observed the other pair. I assume the principals cannot commit to two-period offers. Hence, the first-period offer cannot be contingent on the future information and that the second-period offer is ex post optimal for the principal. This allows transforming a priori an extremely complicated game in contracts into a game where the variables relevant for the other pair are the probabilities with which the two types accept the first-period offer. 2 Even if there is no contract in another pair in the first period, this might still bring some information.
That is why the word "contracting" is used and not "contract".
Naturally, inefficient equilibria with delay are obtained. In a very general framework, I prove two results. The first one is that in any equilibrium with delay the efficient agent has less delay than the inefficient one. This is reminiscent to the standard result of "no distortion at the top". This implies that in the second period the pool of agents is worse than in the first period.
The second result is that the inefficient agent never plays a mixed strategy, i.e. he always either accepts or refuses the first-period offer. While this result has been obtained elsewhere, our setting is different. In Hart and Tirole (1988) a seller sells an indivisible good to a buyer whose type is his private information. If the offer was rejected in the first period, the seller makes an offer in the second period. There, the buyer with a high valuation plays a mixed strategy when the price is between the two types valuations. Then, the low type buyer strictly prefers to reject the offer. In my model the bad type is indifferent in which period to accept the contract. Laffont and Tirole (1990) study dynamic adverse selection with renegotiation. There, the good type mixes in the first period between reporting truthfully and mimicking the bad type in order not to reveal too much information. Here, once the agent accepts the contract, the game is over, thus, he has no incentive to mimic the other type. Laffont and Tirole (1987) consider short-term contracts in two-period adverse selection setup and, thus, can be thought of as being closer to this paper than the previous two. There, both types can mix in the equilibrium; there are equilibria when only the bad type plays a mixed strategy.
The two results, less delay by the good type and no mixing by the bad type, imply that if the inefficient agent accepts the first-period offer, necessarily the efficient agent accepts as well and there is no delay.
These two results hold very generally in the following sense: they are true for any structure of information that becomes available after the first period, i.e. for whatever assumptions about the observability of others' contracting, for any exogenous information (for example, from the bargaining pairs that are not modelled here), etc. In a specific case of no exogenous information, perfect correlation between agents' types and observability of the contract acceptance in the other pair I characterize completely the equilibria in pure strategies and prove some more results on the equilibria in mixed strategies. In particular, the observability which type accepted the first-period offer has a very limited effect on the structure of equilibria. Another result is that better exogenous information reduces delay. This might seem counterintuitive, however, it can be easily understood: better information tomorrow decreases the outside option of the agent already today and thus makes the today's contracting more efficient.
The closest paper, to my knowledge, is Gu and Kahn (1998) . They analyze a game where there are several pairs "union (principal) and firm (agent)". Firms are privately informed about their profitability. Unions make wage demands (offers) to the firms.
Each union observes what happens in other bargaining pairs. However, the differences with the present paper are manyfold. The main one is that in their paper delay would appear even without other bargaining pairs. The unions cannot discriminate between different types of firms but delay some of them. As in many models of bargaining (for example, Hart and Tirole (1988) ), the time acts as a screening dimension. In my model there is one dimension more (quantities produced by the agent); thus, in the absence of information there is no delay. They also don't allow unions to make another offer after the first one was rejected. The firms play only pure strategies.
There are papers of war-of-attrition type like bandit problems (e.g. Bolton and Harris (1999) ) and models of the timing of investment (e.g. Chamley and Gale (1994) ) that study the same trade-off: invest now or wait and invest later having a better information. But in all these papers the decision to undertake has the "0-1" nature, i.e. in each period the player must decide whether to undertake a standard action (investment of a given size) or not. 3 . They lack the agency relationship that is present in this paper and in Gu and Kahn (1998). I have already talked about Hart and Tirole (1988) . 4 In a sense the present paper makes two extensions with respect to their paper: first, the principal asks the agent to produce a variable quantity and not just to buy a good of a fixed size; second, there are two bargaining pairs that can observe each other between the periods. I show that if only the first extension is introduced, all exchange takes place in the first period. This suggests that Coase conjecture has a smaller byte, if the seller has another dimension (quantity) to discriminate among the buyers. Finally, in a formal way, this paper belongs to the multiparty contracting literature (like multiple agents (e.g. Segal (1999) ) and multiple principals (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) ) or bilateral oligopoly (e.g. Inderst and Wey (2003) ). The focus there is very different: they look for a static equilibrium in contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. I solve the model backwards. Before solving for the last stage I need to introduce information in this game which is done in Section 3. In Section 4 I solve the game at the second period, i.e. after the information has been updated. Section 5 defines in-pair equilibria (i.e. played by each pair given the information that arrives after the first period) and 3 I am aware of two exceptions: Whinston (1988) and Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990) , both in the context of an oligopoly in a declining industry where firms adjust their size. The former considers multiplant firms, so they choose the size discreetly, while the latter has a continuous setting. However, it is still a unidimensional decision. 4 They are not the first to study this problem. But they are the first to analyze it under different contractual assumptions.
equilibria of the whole game. Section 6 solves the model in pure strategies, i.e. when the agent either refuses or accepts the first-period contract with probability one. Section 7 studies mixed strategies. It finds the form of reaction functions, i.e. best response of a pair "principal-agent" given the information which is expected to be revealed after the first period. The analysis is performed for any information and the two general results mentioned before are obtained. Then in Section 8 equilibria of the game for a particular structure of information are studied and examples for some surplus functions are given. The role of observability of contract acceptance and the exogenous information are also considered. Section 9 concludes. The simplest proofs are omitted, important and simple proofs are provided in the text, technical and unimportant proofs are delegated to Appendix B.
The model
There are two principals and two agents. I refer to the principals as "she" and to the agents as "he". The principals are identical and the types of the agents are correlated in the sense specified below. Each principal contracts only with "her" agent and each agent can contract only with "his" principal. I refer to the principal and her agent as a "principal-agent" pair. Therefore, we have two "principal-agent" pairs and all the contracting takes place inside pairs and not between the pairs. There are two periods (I also call them "stages"). Each principal needs a production to be done by her agent only once, i.e. either in the first period or in the second one. The output can be interpreted as an infrastructure or a research project, that is why it is needed only once. Each principal derives utility from the production S(q) where q is the quantity or the quality of the production. The function S is concave and satisfies the Inada conditions: S 0 (q) > 0, S 00 (q) < 0, S(0) = 0 and S 0 (0) = ∞.
Agents have linear costs of production: C(q) = θq where θ is their private information. The cost of production θ can be either low θ or high θ > θ. I call the agent with the costs θ "efficient" or "good" agent interchangeably and the agent with θ costs "inefficient" or "bad" agent interchangeably. I also say "efficient type" or "good type" meaning the agent of efficient type, and "inefficient type" or "bad type" for the agent of inefficient type. The initial probability of type θ is ν. The costs of the agents are correlated. There is a common discount factor δ < 1.
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When the production takes place in the first period, the principal gets profits of S(q) − t while the agent gets a rent of t − θq, where t is a transfer from the principal 5 In dynamic adverse selection models it makes sense to consider δ > 1 to reflect the different length of time periods. Here if δ ≥ 1 then everything is delayed until the second period.
to the agent. If the production happens in the second period, both utilities should be multiplied by the discount factor δ.
I assume that the principals cannot commit to two-period offers, that is at the second period, first-period offers do not bind. It also implies that the first-period offer cannot be conditional on the information that arrives afterwards. I believe that this is the most realistic assumption in the reform context. 6 In our example in Introduction, the information (reform experience in the other country) is likely to be "soft" and multidimensional, i.e. not verifiable by courts. The reform proposal is also complicated, so if the government wants to deviate from it in future it can always change it in a way that is not easily observable by courts but affects the firm's profits. Moreover, the identity of the government may change with the time.
The timing of the game is the following. At the beginning of the first period each principal proposes a contract to her agent. The standard assumption that it is the principal who proposes a contract reflects that she has all the bargaining power. A firstperiod contract is a menu {(q 1 , t 1 ), (q 1 , t 1 )} where t 1 and t 1 are transfers to the good and to the bad agent, respectively. Each agent accepts or refuses. If an agent accepts, he produces and the game is over for this pair. If an agent refuses, the pair observes some information that comes from the contracting of the other pair and, possibly, some external information. The principal updates her beliefs about the distribution of types of her agent and offers a second-period contract which is also a menu {(q 2 , t 2 ), (q 2 , t 2 )}. Our assumption of one-period offers and the timing imply that the first-period offer is not conditional on the information revealed after while the second-period offer incorporates the new information.
I denote by α the acceptance probability of the first-period contract by an efficient agent, by α that of an inefficient agent. 7 , 8 These acceptance probabilities can be interpreted as indicating the delay in production: a higher acceptance probability of a type means less delay (less waiting) for this type. So, if α = α = 1 there is no delay and α = α = 0 means maximum (full) delay. The no-commitment assumption implies that contracts cannot be conditional on the contracts of the other pair. The information coming from the other pair is used only to update the principal's beliefs. So, only "real" results of the contracting matter, i.e. the acceptance probabilities. Putting it differently, we are able to rewrite the initial game in contracts as a game in acceptance probabilities. This simplifies the analysis greatly. 6 See, however, Section 7.5 for a short discussion of other contractual assumptions. 7 In the second period agent of either type always accepts the contract (if it gives him nonnegative utility). 8 Revelation Principle allows us to restrict attention to the situations in which the agent, if accepts the first-period offer, chooses the contract correspoding to his type. See also Section 5.
Each pair considers as given the acceptance probabilities β and β of θ and θ-type agents respectively of the other pair. The choice of the pair (α, α) is a two-dimensional reaction function with a two-dimensional argument (β, β). The probabilities (α, α) are chosen by the agent but we focus on those that are optimal for the principal. So, the principal chooses optimal (α, α) given some (β, β). When we say "optimal" or "the best" it is always from the principal's point of view. In other words, the vector of acceptance probabilities of one pair (α, α) is the best (for the principal) response to other pair's acceptance probabilities (β, β). Obviously, for each tuple (α, α) there is an "associated" set of quantities and transfers.
Information structures
If an agent refuses the first-period offer, the pair "principal-agent" observes some new information and then passes to the second period. Before solving for the optimal contract at the second period, I need to introduce information in this game. Then I solve for the optimal contract of the second period (Section 4).
The new information arriving after the first period may come from the contracting of the other pair (I call it "internal" meaning that it is produced inside the model), or it may be exogenous to the model (I call it "external"). Consider the following example of internal information:
Example 1 Take the agents' types to be perfectly correlated. Each pair observes the acceptance/refusal outcome of the other pair but does not observe which type accepted. The relevant information that might become available can be represented as
This matrix should be interpreted as follows. Call "pair 1" the pair that observes and "pair 2" the pair that is observed; agents 1 and 2 belong to pairs 1 and 2 respectively. Rows are contingencies that are observed by the pair 1: the contract is either accepted or refused by the agent 2. The left column represents conditional probabilities of contingencies given that the agent 1 is efficient, i.e.
β ≡ Pr{contract is accepted by agent 2 | agent 1 is good} and 1 − β ≡ Pr{contract is refused by agent 2 | agent 1 is good}.
The right column is conditional probabilities of contingencies given that the agent 1 is inefficient, i.e.
β ≡ Pr{contract is accepted by agent 2 | agent 1 is bad} and 1 − β ≡ Pr{contract is refused by agent 2 | agent 1 is bad}.
Symmetrically, pair 2 observes the same from the pair 1.
External information is any information that does not come from the contracting of the other pair. Take our example in Introduction. There, principals are regulators and agents are local monopolies. Examples of external information in this case are surveys and research on local monopolies, their financial performance, and even relevant anecdotal evidence. It also might be information coming from other countries with similar problems that are not modeled here. Consider the following example of external information:
Example 2 Suppose there is a regulator that wants to reform a local monopoly. There is an extensive research going on that will reveal perfectly the type of the firm but it may not be finished by the second period. The probability that it will be finished by the second period is a which is independent on the type. The contracting of the other pair is not observable at all. The relevant information that might become available can be represented as
← research is finished and reports "good" ← research is finished and reports "bad" ← research is not finished
Here, Pr{research is finished and reports "good"|good agent} = Pr{research is finished and reports "bad"|bad agent} = a; Pr{research is finished and reports "good"|bad agent} = Pr{research is finished and reports "good"|bad agent} = 0 and Pr{research is not finished |good agent} = Pr{research is not finished |bad agent} = 1 − a.
In general, we can write the information that might become available to each pair as follows:
Definition 1 Information structure I of the game is the following matrix:
← contingency n where i = 1, ...n -possible contingencies and p i|k is the conditional probability of contingency i given that the own agent is of type k (k = g for "good"or b for "bad"). We should write p I i|k (β, β) meaning that in general p i|k are different in different information structures and depend on the actions of the other pair β and β. We will not do it unless there is a room for misunderstanding.
If in a contingency i p i|g or p i|b equals to zero then the type of the agent is known: it is the inefficient agent if p i|g = 0 and it is the efficient agent if p i|b = 0. If in an information structure all contingencies have this property then the principal always knows the type of her agent. We can call such an information structure "full information" and it looks like:
In Example 1 such an information structure is obtained if the efficient type always accepts the first-period offer while the inefficient type never does it, i.e. if β = 1 and β = 0. Then an accepted first-period contract in the other pair unambiguously shows that the agent is good and the refusal tells that the agent is bad. In Example 2 full information is reached when a equals 1. The research is finished by the second period and perfectly shows the firm's type.
If a contingency has the same probability to occur for both types, i.e. p i|g = p i|b , then it does not bring any information. It means that the information that the principal already has is not updated (see (5) for the precise formula of beliefs update). An information structure with two identical columns is called "no information" and can be seen as
Take Example 1 with β = β. Then in any contingency the information is not updated: both acceptance and refusal happen equally likely when the agent is good and bad. In Example 2 when there is no report (a = 0) clearly there is no information. Now we can move to the next section where we solve for the optimal second-period contract. As we will see, it is the ratio p i|g p i|b that determines the second-period offer, this is the reason why I introduced informational structures before. and denote ∆θ ≡ θ − θ. As usual, there are two binding constraints: the participation constraint of the inefficient agent (P ) and the incentive compatibility of the efficient agent (IC). Expressing rents as functions of quantities and putting into objective function we get the following expressions for quantities and for rents:
(3) 10 We assume that there is always a solution to the equation for q Now we should find ν i 2 which is the updated probability of efficient type in a contingency i. Denote by p g|i the conditional probability that the agent is efficient given the contingency i and by p ig the joint probability of the contingency i and the agent being efficient. p b|i and p ib are the corresponding probabilities for the inefficient type. The unconditional probability of the good type is p g and it is equal to ν (1 − α) because the initial probability of the good type is ν and he refuses the first-period offer with probability 1−α.
11 The unconditional probability of the bad type is p b equal to
by the similar reasoning. The principal revises the probability that the agent is efficient in a contingency i as
The ratio of probabilities of efficient and inefficient types is then
With this expression of the revision of beliefs we can rewrite the equation in (3) that determines the quantity proposed to the bad agent q i 2 :
In the rest of this subsection we discuss this formula. The denominator of the second ratio in the right hand side will be zero if α = 1 and/or p i|b = 0. In words, the revised probability that the agent is inefficient is zero if the bad agent always accepts the firstperiod contract and/or the information indicates that in this particular contingency the agent is surely good. Given our assumption that S 0 (0) = ∞ the principal will propose in this case the null contract to the inefficient type, i.e. q i 2 = 0, and will leave no rent to the efficient agent:
When both the numerator and denominator of the right hand side of (6) are zero the principal cannot update her beliefs. This happens when p ig = p ib = 0, so ν i 2 in (4) is not defined. Since we consider only the contingencies that can be realized, this situation is clearly not possible on the equilibrium path. However, payoffs in these off-equilibrium situations define outside options on the equilibrium path, that is why we must know what happens there. An example of such a situation is when the efficient type always accepts the first-period offer, i.e. α = 1, and the contingency i is such that it cannot be realized if the type is inefficient: p i|b = 0.
The rent that the principal proposes in these cases puts a lower bound on the rent that the agent has on the equilibrium path. Therefore, it is optimal for the principal to propose the least possible rent, i.e. zero for both types. Since the principal wants the production to take place, she proposes the first-best level of production for the good type with no rent. Thus, we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 1
In a contingency i such that the principal cannot update her beliefs ( ν i 2 in (4) is not defined) she proposes the following contract:
• Efficient agent produces at the first-best level:
• Inefficient agent does not produce q
• Agent of any type gets a zero rent:
This Lemma assures that the efficient agent does not get any rent in a case of indeterminacy, thus he has no incentives to deviate and "create" this indeterminacy. Inefficient agent never gets a rent, so he has no reasons to deviate. It also makes the principal's profit function continuous with respect to α which simplifies the analysis. See details in Appendix A.
Denote by W (q) the social surplus from the production
and V i 2 the value of the principal's problem (2) in a contingency i. Then
Expected payoffs of the second period
In this subsection we derive payoffs of the principal and her agent when the agent refused the first-period offer and before the information becomes available. These expected second-period payoffs will determine the first-period contract (see Sections 6 and 7). Let x be a random variable over contingencies. Then E[x] is the unconditional expectation and E k [x] is the conditional expectation of x given that the agent is of type k (we omit the superscript i in x i unless it creates a confusion):
For example, in the second period in a contingency i the social surplus from the production of the bad type is W (q i 2 ). So, the expected social surplus from the production of the bad type in the second period is
If the first-period offer is refused, the expected second-period profit of the principal is (V i 2 given by (7))
The first term of this expression is the production by the efficient type; it happens with probability p g . The second term is expected rent paid to the efficient agent; since it is paid only when the agent is efficient, its expectation should be conditioned on the agent being efficient. The last term is the production by the bad agent; it should be conditioned on the agent being inefficient.
Definition of the equilibria
Let us first define the equilibrium inside each pair given what it observes from the contracting of the other pair.
The principal proposes the first-period menu c 1 = {(q 1 , t 1 ), (q 1 , t 1 )} that the agent accepts with probabilities (α, α). In fact, we should also specify what contract the agent accepts. However, by the Revelation Principle we can restrict our attention to the cases where the agent reports truthfully, once he has decided to accept the first-period offer. If the agent accepts, the game is over; if the agent refuses, both principal and agent observe the contingency i in which they find themselves. The principal updates her beliefs toν i 2 (probability of the good type) and proposes the second-period menu c
2 )} that the agents accepts with probabilities (α 2 , α 2 ). 12 We can define the in-pair equilibrium of the game as follows.
Definition 2 An in-pair equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a pair "principalagent" given the information structure of the game. Principal's offers c 1 and {c 12 Clearly, at the second stage, since it is the last stage, the principal proposes a contract which is surely accepted, i.e. α P3 (α, α) are optimal for the agent given c 1 and the fact that they will enter {c
through the beliefs update; P4 c 1 is optimal for the principal given subsequent strategies; Bν i 2 is derived from the prior ν, (α, α) and the information structure by Bayes' rule, i.e.ν
In this definition we omitted arguments in the strategies for the sake of conciseness. The previous history enters in the arguments. The first-period acceptance probabilities (α, α) depend on the proposed menu c 1 , the second-period offers c i 2 depend on the firstperiod one c 1 and acceptance probabilities (α, α), etc. Note, however, that as we consider short-term contracts the first-period history matters for the second period only through the update of beliefs. The updated probability of the good type ν i 2 summarizes all relevant information that comes from the first period and from the contracting of the other pair.
Given what happens in the other pair, the first-period acceptance probabilities define the contracting in the second period. It turns out to be extremely useful to characterize an in-pair equilibrium by the first-period probabilities (α, α). Indeed, given some (α, α) there is in general unique or no first-period offer that is consistent with them. 13 See Lemma 2, 3, 5 and 6 for more details. In what follows we call pure strategy in-pair equilibrium an in-pair equilibrium where the first-period probabilities (α, α) are either zero or one. Otherwise it is a mixed strategy in-pair equilibrium.
There are many in-pair equilibria. We focus on the one that gives the maximum payoff for the principal. This is the standard way to proceed in the literature, see, in particular, Tirole (1987, 1990 ) for adverse selection environment and Fudenberg and Tirole (1988) for the moral hazard setting. While pure strategy in-pair equilibria can be easily induced by the principal it is more difficult to implement a particular mixed strategy in-pair equilibrium. Laffont and Tirole (1990) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1988) show that the Harsanyi's purification result can be applied in their settings. 14 In what follows we only consider in-pair equilibria optimal for the principal (sometimes we call them optimal for the clarity of exposition). Since they depend on the actions of the other pair we also call them reaction functions.
Now we define the equilibrium of the whole game. Acceptance probabilities (α, α) in the in-pair equilibrium of one pair depend on the acceptance probabilities (β, β) that are played by the agent in the other pair, i.e. (α, α)-in-pair equilibrium is the best response to (β, β). If the reverse is also true, this is an equilibrium of the whole game.
Definition 3 An equilibrium of the whole game is a pair of two in-pair equilibria such that each of them is in-pair equilibrium when the other pair plays the other in-pair equilibrium, i.e. it is a Nash equilibrium of two in-pair equilibria.
As every in-pair equilibrium can be characterized by the two first-period acceptance probabilities, an equilibrium of the whole game is characterized by four probabilities (α, α, β, β). As with in-pair equilibria we distinguish between pure strategy and mixed strategy equilibria.
Pure strategy equilibria
In Section 4 we analyzed the second stage of the game. Given some probabilities (α, α) with which the two types accept the first-period offer, the principal computes the expected profits of the second period V 2 . Using these results, Section 6.1 shows the optimal first-period offers and corresponding principal's payoffs for four possible pure strategies of the agent. A partial characterization of in-pair equilibria is given. Section 6.2 studies the equilibria of the whole game for a class of information structures with all p i|b positive.
In-pair equilibria
When both α and α are restricted to be zero or one there are four possible cases since the two types have two strategies each, accept the first-period offer or not. In our notation, (α, α) equal (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1) or (0, 0). First, we prove that (0, 1) are not implementable. We say that the first-period acceptance probabilities are not implementable if they cannot be a part of any in-pair equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Inefficient agent always accepting the first-period offer and efficient agent refusing it with a positive probability, i.e. (α, 1) with α < 1, cannot be a part of any first-period Nash equilibrium, i.e. if α = 1, then α = 1.
Proof. If α = 1 in the second period the principal is sure to face the efficient agent. Then she proposes him a contract with no rent. Any first-period offer that inefficient agent accepts gives some rent to the efficient type, so he will always accept the firstperiod offer. Thus, α = 1.
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Let V (α, α, β, β) be the principal's intertemporal profit function. When the agent plays a strategy (α, α) and the principal wants him to play this strategy, she offers a contract that satisfies his incentives to participate and to play this strategy (α, α). Since it is the principal who makes the offer, the contract menu is optimal for the principal subject to participation and incentive compatibility constraints of the agent. The acceptance probabilities of the other pair (β, β) enter the profit function by determining the conditional probabilities p i|k in the information structure. Next Lemma gives expressions for the principal's profits when agent plays an implementable strategy, i.e. (1, 1) , (1, 0) or (0, 0).
Lemma 3
Given the acceptance probabilities of the other pair (β, β) and the strategy of the agent (α, α)
• If the agent plays "no delay" strategy α = α = 1 the principal's profits are the second-best payoff of the adverse selection problem with the (initial) probability ν of efficient type
where q SB the second-best quantity with the (initial) probability ν of efficient type.
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• If the agent plays "delay for the bad type" strategy (1, 0) the principal's profits are the first-surplus from the efficient type minus the discounted rent of the efficient type in the contingencies when his deviation cannot be detected plus the discounted first-best surplus from the inefficient type
15 Clearly, the inability of the principal to commit to a second period contract is crucial for nonimplementability. 16 Note that for a given informational structure there might be some other acceptance probabilities that are not implementable. For example, if in the second period the type of the agent is always known then any α < 1 is not implementable since the efficient agent never gets a rent in the second period. 17 It is given by the first-order condition
• If the agent plays "delay for both types" strategy (0, 0) the principal's profits are the discounted expected second-best payoff of the second period
Remark 1 (β, β) do not enter V (1, 1, β, β), determine p i|g and p i|b in the two other cases (in the third case
Proof. If the agent plays "no delay" strategy all production takes place in the first period and the principal does not make any use of the information coming afterwards (Lemma 1 guarantees that the efficient type does not want to deviate).
If the agent plays "delay for the bad type" strategy the principal proposes the firstbest contract to the inefficient type in the second period. If the efficient agent deviates (i.e. refuses the first-period contract) he gets the rent of ∆θq F B in a contingency i in which the principal proposes the first-best contract for the inefficient type. By Lemma 1 this happens only in contingencies where p i|b > 0. Since the agent is good, the probability of any contingency is p i|g . So, to accept the first-period the efficient type must be offered the rent of ∆θ δq
If the agent plays "delay for both types" strategy all production takes place in the second period. The profits of the principal are then δV 2 (looking from the first period), where V 2 is given by 8 with p g = ν and p b = 1 − ν.
In general it is not possible to say which of these three cases is more beneficial for the principal. Clearly, if the future is very remote (low discount factor δ) the no-delay solution (1, 1) is preferred to the other two. Proposition 1 provides more insights on the role of the information. Loosely speaking, it says that both very clean and very noisy information (in terms of P i:p i|b >0 p i|g ) favor delay. One can interpret P i:p i|b >0 p i|g as a measure of the "noisiness" of information since it equals
The sum P i:p i|b =0 p i|g is the probability that in the second period the principal knows for sure that the agent is efficient. For the "full information" structure defined at the end of Section 3 this probability is one while for "no information" structure it is zero. So, P i:p i|b >0 p i|g is the probability that the principal assigns some chances that the agent is inefficient, in which case the good agent receives a positive rent. A very clean information (low P i:p i|b >0 p i|g ) discourages the delay of the efficient type while a very noisy information (high P i:p i|b >0 p i|g ) makes the delay by the inefficient type less probable.
Proposition 1
If an information structure I is such that the good type is often unambiguously revealed ( P i:p i|b >0 p i|g is low enough), then the principal prefers delay for the bad type (1, 0) to the delay for both types (0, 0).
If an information structure I is "noisy" ( P i:p i|b >0 p i|g is high enough), then the principal prefers no delay (1, 1) to delay for the bad type (1, 0).
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Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition for the first part of Proposition 1 is the following. If it is highly probable that there will be a contingency such that the agent is unambiguously efficient, the good agent does not have a high expected rent in the second period and he agrees to produce in the first period for a small rent. If it is not the case, the principal prefers to wait until the second period to diminish his rent.
In the second part of Proposition the "noisiness" of information makes the deviation (refusal of the first-period contract) by the good agent very attractive. The good agent, if he deviates, is rarely discovered and enjoys a high rent since the bad agent produces at the first-best level. Then the principal prefers to distort the production of the inefficient type to decrease the rent of the efficient type. She can always do it by moving all the production to the first period.
The second result can be also understood along the lines of the proof. Assume that all p i|b are positive. Then the principal's payoff (10) does not depend on the information available after the first period. Among all possible cases when the principal does not use, or does not have, information about other agent she prefers the no-delay case (1, 1).
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By continuity, this remains true when there is a small probability of p i|b being zero.
Equilibria of the whole game
Each pair can play one of three pure strategies. In general, i.e. for an arbitrary information structure, Nash equilibria in pure strategies might not exist. However, if one strategy is always dominated then there is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, since the two pairs "principal-agent" are symmetric the game is symmetric 20 and when there are only two possible strategies there is always a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 18 Later (Lemma 7) we prove that no delay is optimal in the general case, i.e. even when mixed strategies are allowed. 19 In Lemma 7 we prove that when there is no information no delay (1, 1) is optimal. 20 By a symmetric game we mean a game in which the set of strategies is the same for both players and payoffs are symmetric. When there are two strategies, the matrix form of the game is
Consider an informational structure I such that all p i|b are positive. Such a structure may reflect some exogenous noise that does not allow to have perfect signals. Then Proposition 1 asserts that the principal chooses between only two strategies: no delay (1, 1) and delay for both types (0, 0).
To simplify further exposition we need to introduce some notation. Denote by ct(I) the last two terms of V 2 in (8):
meaning the "content" of an informational structure. A change in information structure influences these and only these terms in V 2 , thus ct(I) can be thought as a measure of the quality of an informational structure.
We can write (9) as
where NI stays for "no information" structure defined in (1), and (11) as
Comparing them, we see that the principal prefers no delay (1, 1) to delay for both types (0, 0) if and only if
i.e. if the information is not good enough in terms of its ct(I).
Define by I * the information structure such that (12) is satisfied as equality. This is an information structure such that the principal is indifferent between no delay and delay for both types; in other words, the benefits of information received after the first period equal exactly the cost of waiting. Assume for the moment that when the other pair plays no-delay strategy, i.e. all the contracting takes place in the first period, the principal observes a lot and she is almost sure about the type of her agent (she cannot be always completely sure since we consider an information structure with all p i|b positive). This means that unless the discount factor is very small, the principal prefers to wait until the second period. In our notation, ct(I 1,1 ) > ct(I * ). Also assume that if the other pair does not contract, the information is barely updated, so there is no point in waiting and the principal implements the no-delay outcome. We write in this case: ct(I * ) > ct(I 0,0 ).
Then there is an equilibrium of the form: one pair plays no delay and another one plays
For any values a, b, c, d there is always a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
the delay for both types. Indeed, if pair 1 plays no delay, the pair 2 waits, so pair 1 does not update and plays no delay. This is the first equilibrium in Proposition 2.
In fact, when in the other pair there is delay for both types, the information I 0,0 can be interpreted as exogenous information. Since both types refuse for sure, a refusal is not likely to add any information to the exogenous information. So, when there is any positive probability of acceptance, there is more information. In particular, ct(I 1,1 ) ≥ ct(I 0,0 ).
Another equilibrium exists when, for instance, the discount factor is very small, so ct(I * ) > ct(I 1,1 ). For whatever information that can be available, both pairs prefer to produce everything in the first period (equilibrium 2). Equilibrium 3 exists when the exogenous information is very good: ct(I * ) < ct(I 0,0 ). Whatever can be deduced from the contracting of the other pair, the exogenous part of information makes the waiting beneficial, so both pairs prefer to delay both types.
Proposition 2 When only pure strategies are considered and all p i|b > 0, given an information structure I β,β the equilibrium profile (α, α, β, β) of acceptance probabilities is (assuming ct(I 1,1 ) ≥ ct(I 0,0 )):
1. If internal information is good and exogenous information is bad ct(I 1,1 ) > ct(I * ) ≥ ct(I 0,0 ) there are two asymmetric equilibria: no delay in one pair and delay for both types in the other (1, 1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1, 1).
If internal information is bad ct(I
there is a unique no delay equilibrium
(1, 1, 1, 1).
3. If exogenous information is good ct(I * ) < ct(I 0,0 ) there is a unique delay for both types equilibrium (0, 0, 0, 0).
Remark 2
If delay for both types in the other pair is more informative than no delay and the former is good while the latter is bad ct(I 0,0 ) > ct(I * ) ≥ ct(I 1,1 ) (which is hard to imagine) there are two symmetric equilibria: no delay (1, 1, 1, 1) and delay for both types (0, 0, 0, 0).
In the case of asymmetric equilibria 1 there is one pair which is a "provider" of information contracting in the first period, and another one benefits from it and contracts in the second period. This might be the reason why UK has reformed its monopolies (railways, gas, electricity, telecom) earlier than the continental Europe: there is an asymmetric equilibrium in which Europe delays and waits while UK acts first and provides information.
There is a simple Corollary:
Corollary 1 If exogenous information is bad ct(I 0,0 ) ≤ ct(I * ), at least one pair produces with no delay.
In other words, exogenous information is favorable for the delay. However, this result does not hold generally: as we will see later (Section 8.4) in mixed strategy equilibria a better exogenous information decreases delay.
Mixed strategy in-pair equilibria
Now we study the general case, i.e. we allow the agents' strategies to be mixed. The aim of this section is to derive the acceptance probabilities (α, α) of each pair that are optimal for the principal, i.e. we study the preferences of the principal over (α, α) given the information coming after the first period. As we noted in Section 2 when we introduced the model, the no-commitment assumption for the principal implies that the exact form of the other pair's contract is not relevant. What matters is only the acceptance probabilities. So, the optimal pair (α, α) is a two-dimensional reaction function with a two-dimensional argument (β, β).
Optimal first-period offer given acceptance probabilities (α,α)
In this section for a given pair of acceptance probabilities (α, α) we characterize the first-period offer {(q 1 , t 1 ), (q 1 , t 1 )} such that they make a part of an in-pair equilibrium.
It is useful to introduce the following notation
We can write the second-period quantity (6) as a function of γ:
If γ = 0 (α = 1), then the principal is sure to meet the bad type agent in the second period, so q
for all i. When γ = ∞ (α = 1) it is necessarily a good agent if the contracting takes place in the second period, and q i 2 = 0 for all i.As S(q) is a concave function, q i0 2α is positive and q i0 2γ is negative. A lower α or a higher γ means a smaller probability of the good type, so the rent-efficiency trade-off changes in favor of a less distortion for the bad type. Clearly, for any γ there is a continuum of pairs (α, α) that correspond to this γ. Now we will find the optimal first-period offer for a given γ. We will do separately for α < 1 and α = 1. As in Section 4.1 we can replace transfers by rents in the principal's problem: U 1 ≡ t 1 − θq 1 and U 1 ≡ t 1 − θq 1 and write the first-period offer in the form {(q 1 , U 1 ), (q 1 , U 1 )}. Lemma 5 characterizes this menu for α < 1. Its main result is that the quantity for the inefficient type equals his discounted expected second-period quantity:
. Indeed, the good agent receives the same rent in the first period as in the second one. In the first period he receives ∆θq 1 and the expected discounted rent of the second period is δ ∆θ E g [q 2 (γ)].
To simplify further exposition and without altering any results we make the following Assumption:
Assumption 1 The first-period contract designed for a type is continuous with respect to the acceptance probability of this type at zero.
It implies that, for example, if the efficient agent always produces at the first-best level, the principal still proposes him this level of production when α = 0. The next Lemma establishes that indeed this Assumption is innocuous.
Lemma 4 Assumption 1 does not change the principal's profits as compared to the case when she proposes a null contract (zero quantity, zero rent) for the type which refuses for sure.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 5 For γ > 0 (α < 1) the first-period offer {(q 1 , U 1 ), (q 1 , U 1 )} is characterized by:
• Efficient agent earns a positive rent:
• Inefficient agent earns no rent:
• Inefficient agent's quantity equals his discounted expected second-period quantity:
The Lemma says that the contract menu is the standard second-best menu and only the downward distortion for the bad type is determined differently.
Proof. Due to Lemma 4 we have to consider only α, α > 0. For given (α, α) the second period is completely determined. The principal maximizes her payoff in the first period, i.e. she solves the following problem:
This problem is standard with the exception of the last constraint IC int (for intertemporal) which says that the rents in the first and the second periods must be equal because the good type plays a mixed strategy. This gives directly the expressions for U 1 and q 1 . The results for U 1 and q 1 are also obvious from the problem.
Remark 3 Note that the intertemporal incentive compatibility constraint of the inefficient type IC int was omitted since it is always satisfied: inefficient type always receives a zero rent.
Let us move to the case when the good type always accepts the first-period offer (α = 1). Then, in the second period the principal faces only the bad type and, therefore, contracts at the first-best level. The IC int constraint becomes
(Lemma 1 sets q i 2 equal to zero when p i|b is zero). If this constraint binds, the first-period offer is the same as the one in the case of α < 1: the production of the inefficient type is given by his discounted expected secondperiod production. Since α = 1 the principal will propose the first-best contract for the bad type in the second-period unless she receives a contradictory signal that p i|b = 0. Thus, q 1 = δq
The form of the first-period offer is then the same as the one identified in Lemma 5. If the constraint (15) does not bind, then the principal solves a standard adverse-selection problem with probability ν of the efficient type and probability (1 − ν)α of inefficient type. Note that if the bad type always accepts in the first period (i.e. α = 1) then the principal will not give any rent in the second period, so the constraint (15) is not relevant in this case. This is summarized in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 For γ = 0 (α = 1) the first-period contract {(q 1 , U 1 ), (q 1 , U 1 )} is characterized by:
• Inefficient agent earns no rent: U 1 = 0,
• Inefficient agent's quantity equals -if α = 1: the usual second-best quantity with probabilities ν and (1 − ν)α of the good and the bad type, respectively:
where q 1 (α) is given by
-if α < 1: the maximum of his discounted expected second-period quantity and the usual second-best quantity with probabilities ν and (1 − ν)α of the good and the bad type, respectively: q 1 = max{δq
Thanks to the three Lemmas of this section we can write the payoff of the principal for a given pair (α, α) and study her preferences over different pairs. In the next section I show that it is not optimal for the principal to induce mixed strategies for the both types, i.e. if both α and α are strictly between 0 and 1 her profits are not maximized (Proposition 3). Then at least one type plays a pure strategy (sure acceptance or refusal of the first-period offer); this is studied in Section 7.3.
A proof that at least one type plays a pure strategy
In this section we consider the case when both types play a mixed strategy, i.e. both α and α are strictly between 0 and 1. We prove that this cannot be optimal for the principal. Let us write the principal's intertemporal profit function. Lemma 5 establishes that if the efficient type plays a mixed strategy, then q 1 = δE g [q 2 ]. His expected rent U can be written as
The principal's intertemporal profits are then
The first term V 1 is the surplus from the efficient type: the production is always at the first-best level and with probability 1 − α it happens in the second period. V 2 is the expected rent to the efficient type. V 3 is the first-period surplus from the inefficient agent. V 4 is the expected second-period surplus from the inefficient type. As in Section 6 with pure strategies, β and β enter the profit function by determining
Now we are ready to prove the announced result of this section.
Proposition 3
In an optimal in-pair equilibrium at least one type plays a pure strategy.
The logic of the proof is the following. We want to prove that when both types play a mixed strategy, the principal's profits are not maximized, i.e. the first-order and secondorder conditions for the maximization of V (α, α, β, β) cannot be satisfied simultaneously. 
Optimal in-pair equilibria
Proposition 3 shows that at least one type plays a pure strategy. Therefore, there are four possible cases of acceptance probabilities α and α : (α, 1), (α, 0), (1, α) and (0, α). Lemma 2 established that if α = 1 then α = 1 as well. In Proposition 4 I prove that if α equals 1 then α is 1 or 0. I also show α is never equal to zero. Therefore, the principal's profits reach the maximum at one of the three points: (1, 1), (1, 0) or (α, 0) with α > 0.
These results have the following economic interpretation. First, if there is a delay in production, the efficient agent has less delay than the inefficient one. This is reminiscent to the standard result of "no distortion at the top". Second, the inefficient agent never plays a mixed strategy, i.e. he always either accepts or refuses the first-period offer. So, if the inefficient agent accepts the first-period offer, he does it always. Then necessarily the efficient agent accepts as well and there is no delay.
Note that the fact that only efficient type plays a mixed strategy is found in dynamic adverse selection models (e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1990) ). Here we allow for the improvement of information between periods, thus we prove the same result in a more general framework.
Proposition 4 The principal's profits reach the maximum when the agent's strategy (α, α) is one of the following three strategies:
• No delay (1, 1);
• Delay for the bad type (1, 0);
• Delay for the bad type and partial delay for the good type (α, 0), where α > 0 is given by (if it exists)
In fact, the problem of the principal can be decomposed in two stages: first, she chooses whether the inefficient agent produces (α is one or zero). If yes, the efficient agent produces as well (α = 1) since she cannot commit to give him any rent in the second period. If no, the principal chooses the optimal delay for the efficient type, i.e. his probability of acceptance α. She chooses therefore between V (1, 1, β, β) and max α V (α, 0, β, β).
Note that generically there is a unique pair (α, α) that maximizes the principal's payoff. Then, the principal does not play a mixed strategy.
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Comparing the reaction function in pure strategies with that in mixed strategies we see that the strategy (0, 0) can be interpreted as a pure strategy analogue of (α, 0).
We already know that when there is no information arriving after the first period, the principal prefers no delay to delay of the bad type (Proposition 1, part 2). Intuitively, in this case no delay should be optimal. This is the following Lemma.
Lemma 7
When there is no information arriving after the first period, no delay is optimal.
This result should be contrasted to the one of Hart and Tirole (1988) and other bargaining models where delay arises in the equilibrium. Here, the principal is able to discriminate among agents by the quantity, she does not need to use time for this. This suggests that Coase conjecture should be checked in this setting and it probably has a smaller byte.
Comparative statics with respect to the discount factor
As a comparative statics exercise let us see how the delay depends on the discount rate. Intuitively, it should increase with the discount rate. We check it in two steps. First, when the principal chooses between V (1, 1, β, β) and max α V (α, 0, β, β) a higher δ favors the choice of max α V (α, 0, β, β) since it increases with the discount factor while no delay profits V (1, 1, β, β) do not depend on it. Second, consider the choice of optimal α. If the solution to (18) exists we can prove that it is decreasing in the discount rate. Differentiate V 0 α (α, 0, β, β) in (18) with respect to δ :
When δ decreases, α increases which means less waiting. Moreover, for δ small enough V 0 α (α, 0, β, β) given by (18) is always positive, so α = 1. We established therefore that the optimal (for the principal) delay decreases (non-strictly) with the discount factor.
Note that this is the effect on the delay given the information structure. It does not necessarily imply that the equilibrium amount of delay will change in the same direction. As we will see in Section 8, there will be indeed more waiting following an increase in the discount rate in stable equilibria while in unstable equilibria the effect is opposite.
Other contractual assumptions
I have assumed that only short-term contracts are feasible. While I think they are the most realistic in the context of a reform, which is my motivating example, let us discuss shortly how in-pair equilibria might change under alternative assumptions: renegotiated long-term contracts, long-term contracts without renegotiation, long-term contracts without renegotiation conditional on the observable outcome of the other pair.
Renegotiated long-term contracts. The principal makes the following first-period offer: she proposes a first-period menu and a set of second-period menus, one per each contingency, to be proposed for the agent in case he refuses the first-period offer. Each second-period menu specifies some rent and quantity for each type; for the renegotiationproofness the quantities must be ex post efficient. This means that they must coincide with the solution of the second-period problem subject to the new participation constraints (the principal has to give at least the promised rent). In other words, this is a problem with countervailing incentives.
Since the observable contingency is not contractable, it is at the principal's discretion to pick up a menu at the second stage. As the agent cares only about rents there is no loss of generality if only rents are specified (then the principal chooses the quantities).
It is possible to show that the principal finds optimal (a) not to promise any rent for the bad type; (b) to promise the same rent for the good type in all contingencies.
With only short-term contracts when the agent mixes the first-period inefficient type quantity is pinned down by his expected second-period rent (see Lemma 5) . It is not the case anymore once the principal is able to promise credibly a rent in the second period. The principal has one more degree of freedom and this complicates the problem a lot.
Another change is that the strategy (α, 1) becomes implementable. If the probability of the bad type is high enough, delay for the good type (0, 1) outperforms delay for the bad type (1, 0) .
Long-term contracts without renegotiation. The principal might use her commitment power to promise to the good type a rent smaller than he expects to get without any promise. When the agent plays a mixed strategy, this can be used to decrease the first-period quantity of the inefficient type and thus decrease the good agent's rent. It is an open question whether the principal wants to do this.
Conditional long-term contracts without renegotiation. When the principals are able to propose contracts contingent on the outcome of the other pair there is some hope that mechanisms of the type of Crémer and McLean (1988) will allow to approach the first best. Under limited liability (or risk aversion) their result does not hold, as shown by Robert (1991) among others, at least for a weak correlation of agents' types. Since there is no general result in this area it is not clear to which extent studying contingent contracts in the present setup can bring interesting and fairly general results.
Mixed strategy equilibria of the whole game
In this section I study the equilibria of the game in the general case, i.e. when mixed strategies of the agent are allowed. To make the analysis tractable I assume a particular information structure and, later, particular surplus functions to see how equilibria might look like.
Take the Example 1 of Section 3 when the type of the agent that has accepted the first-period contract is also observed. Then the information structure is of the following form:
← acceptance by good type ← acceptance by bad type ← refusal
In words, agents of two pairs are perfectly correlated and contracts of the first period are perfectly observed. In a sense, it is the most "transparent" information structure.
Equilibria in pure strategies
Suppose that the other pair plays a pure strategy: β = 1, so it plays (1, 1) or (1, 0) . Then the type of the agent is known by the second period, so the efficient agent does not get any rent. Stating it differently, E g [q 2 ] = 0. Therefore, the equation (18) does not have solutions and the principal chooses between (1, 1) and (1, 0) .
Lemma 8
When the agents are perfectly correlated, the contracts in each pair are perfectly observable by other pair and there is no external information, i.e. for the information structure
← acceptance by good type ← acceptance by bad type ← refusal if one pair plays a pure strategy, the other pair plays a pure strategy as well.
and V (1, 0, β, β) (10)
(we used that P i:p i|b >0 p i|g = 0) we see that there exists the threshold discount factor δ * that equalizes V (1, 1, β, β) and V (1, 0, β, β)
such that for δ > δ * (1, 0) is preferred by the principal while for δ ≤ δ * she chooses
(1, 1). 23 Moreover, since the game is symmetric and the information revealed by (1, 0) and (1, 1) is the same, the two principals make the same choice. Thus, we write the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 When the agents are perfectly correlated, the contracts in each pair are perfectly observable by other pair and there is no external information, i.e. for the information structure 22 δ * is always between 0 and 1 since W (q SB ) − ν 1−ν ∆θq SB is positive (otherwise the bad type would not produce) and less than W (q F B ). 23 The assumption that for δ = δ * the principal chooses (1, 1) is not important.
← acceptance by good type ← acceptance by bad type ← refusal there is always a unique equilibrium if only pure strategies are allowed. It is no-delay equilibrium (1, 1, 1, 1 ) for low discount factors δ ≤ δ * and delay for the bad type equilibrium (1, 0, 1, 0) for high discount factors δ > δ * where δ * is given by (20).
Equilibria in mixed strategies

Transformation of condition (18)
Now let us look at the case when β < 1. This means that the other pair plays (β, 0) and the contingency "the first-period contract is accepted by the bad type" does not exist. The information structure can be written as
The efficient type that refuses the first-period contract gets zero rent because the principal discovers his type with probability β and he gets δ ∆θ q r 2 with probability 1 − β. The quantity q r 2 (index "r" stays for the refusal of the first-period contract in the other pair) is given by (see (6) for the general case)
α is given by (18) for which we need to compute E g [q 0 2α ] :
(18) becomes
To guarantee that the solution to this equation is indeed the maximum of V (α, 0, β, β) I assume that S 000 (q) > 0 (see Remark 5 after the proof of Proposition 4):
If (23) does not have solutions (as, for instance, for β close to 1), then the maximum of V (α, 0, β, β) is reached at α = 1.
Suppose that the solution to (23) exists. We denote it α(β) and study now its behavior. Differentiating (23) with respect to β yields
where
Φ(q) is positive given our assumption that S 000 (q) is positive. The term in square brackets in the left hand side of (24) is then positive. The only possibility that α 0 β equals 0 is to have the term in square brackets in the right hand side equal 0. Denote
(21) is now
which means that q r 2 , S(q r 2 ) and all its derivatives are functions of θ + x. Equalizing the term in square brackets in the right hand side of (24) to zero can be written as β can be determined as follows: inspecting (24) we see that for α and β close to 1 this derivative is positive. In neighborhood regions signs are always different. Then we draw α(β) rather arbitrary since it is behavior is not very clear in the general case. There are just few sure features: first, α(0) > 0; second, α(β) = 1 for β close to 1; third, α(β) cannot enter a "+"-region from a "-"-region above.
Since the game is symmetric, every crossing of α(β) and the diagonal is a symmetric equilibrium. There are four possible types of symmetric equilibria: Type 1. α = β = 1. This equilibrium always exists and stable. When β = 1 equation (23) does not have solutions, so α is also 1. Stable equilibria in mixed strategies (i.e. types 3 and 4) pass the intuitive test of the effect of the discount rate. From the previous subsection we know that α 0 δ is negative for any given β. Graphically, it means that the curve α(β) goes down when δ increases. It is easy to see from Figure 1 that equilibrium values of α (and β) will decrease in stable (types 3 and 4) equilibria while in non-stable (type 2) equilibria they will increase.
Non-generically, there might be other equilibria: 1) α
Note that in the areas where α The first-order condition (23) becomes
This equation has a solution for some β when the left-hand side is less than one. This solution α(β) is strictly increasing. Therefore, there is no equilibrium of type 4 since 24 m, n > 0. We put the free term equal zero to have S(0) = 0. We also need n > θ to be able to find q F B (which is the maximum possible q). Finally, we need the inefficient type not to be shut. If his probability is small enough, he will not produce (see Footnote 10) . So, we have to suppose that 1 − ν is sufficiently high. there is no equilibria in mixed strategies (left); when it is less than 4 27 there are two mixed strategy equilibria: stable (type 3) and unstable (type 2) in (right).
there is no regions where α(β) is decreasing. If the left-hand side is less than 4 27 there are two mixed strategy equilibria, stable (type 3) and unstable (type 2), otherwise there is no equilibrium in mixed strategies. Figure 2 depicts the two cases.
Equilibria when equation (26) has a unique solution
Consider now another surplus function
and has a unique solution
Plugging the expression for x from its definition in (25) we find (
This equation has solutions (α, β) if and only if the right-hand side is less than one, i.e. 2θ < ν 1−ν ∆θ. A possible behavior of α(β) is plotted in Figure 3 . In fact, this example illustrates the structure of equilibria for any surplus function such that (26) has a unique solution.
8.3 Role of the observability of the agent's type that accepted the first-period contract
In this subsection I discuss how the equilibria look like if each pair can observe whether the first-period offer was accepted or refused but does not observe what contract (for which type) has been accepted. This is Example 1 of Section 3. The information structure is
When the other pair plays (β, 0) the type of the agent is revealed if the first-period contract was accepted. Therefore, all equilibria in mixed strategies are the same as with full observability.
Proposition 6 For the two information structures
← acceptance by good type ← acceptance by bad type ← refusal (i.e. when the agents are perfectly correlated, the contracts in each pair are perfectly observable by other pair and there is no external information) and
e. when the agents are perfectly correlated, each pair observes whether the contract was accepted or refused in the other pair (but does not observe what contract was accepted) and there is no external information) equilibria in mixed strategies coincide.
Pure strategy equilibria can be different, however. If the other pair plays (1, 1) it does not bring any information. There is no sense to postpone production and the second pair's optimal response is (1, 1) as well. So, the no-delay equilibrium (1, 1, 1, 1 ) always exists. If the discount factor is low, this is the only equilibrium in pure strategies. If it is high enough, there is also the equilibrium (1, 0, 1, 0) . The following Proposition states the structure of pure strategies equilibria (compare with Proposition 5 for the full observability case).
Proposition 7
When the agents are perfectly correlated, each pair observes whether the contract was accepted or refused in the other pair (but does not observe what contract was accepted) and there is no external information, i.e. for the information structure
there is always no-delay equilibrium (1, 1, 1, 1) . For δ > δ * there is also delay for the bad type equilibrium (1, 0, 1, 0) where δ * is given by (20).
The only difference with the equilibria under full observability is that now (1, 1, 1, 1) exists always while before it was only if δ < δ * . In a sense, it is not a great difference (remember that mixed strategy equilibria coincide). However, it seems to be the artifact of the two-type model since it is unlikely that with more types all types but one will be delayed until the second period. I conjecture that in that case the equilibria will be much more different.
Effect of exogenous information
Here we study the impact of the exogenous information. Take the information structure (19) and assume that with probability p, independent on players' actions, the type of the agent is revealed. The information structure is then 1) or (1, 0) is played, i.e. a pure strategy of one pair implies a pure strategy of the other pair. Moreover, the profits of the principal are unchanged as compared to Section 8.1.
Let us consider now the other pair playing a mixed strategy (β, 0), β < 1. If the first-period offer in the other pair is refused and there is no revelation, the principal updates her beliefs exactly in the same way as without the external information. Hence, she sets the same inefficient agent's quantity q r 2 given by (21). Then (22) becomes (18) with respect to p yields
2α > 0. Therefore, a higher probability of revelation p leads to a higher acceptance probability α. Graphically, the curve α(p) moves up. Then, in stable equilibria (types 3 and 4) there will be less delay. Proposition 8 summarizes the discussion about equilibria for the information structure considered.
Proposition 8 When the agents are perfectly correlated, the contracts in each pair are perfectly observable by other pair and there is exogenous revelation, i.e. for the information structure Finally, it might be interesting to develop a more specific setting of industrial organization. Besides discounting the parties may have other reasons to value the present more than the future, for example, a possible entrance of other firms, that can be different in different equilibria. Agents may compete in the same market, thus, the interactions between real and informational externalities might be studied.
In the same way, the rent U 2 is not continuous in α when α = 1 : for α < 1 q 
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
The first part. From (10) and (11) V (1, 0, β, β) ≥ V (0, 0, β, β) if and only if
where the expectations in
] depend on the information structure we cannot affirm that a lower P i:p i|b >0 p i|g always favors the strategy (1, 0). However, there is a sufficient condition:
The second part. Consider an information structure such that p i|b > 0 for all i. Then
The first inequality follows from the concavity of W (q); the second one follows from the definition of q SB (equality is reached in a non-generic case when δq F B = q SB ).
The result follows by continuity for information structures with P i:p i|b >0 p i|g close enough to one.
Proof of Lemma 4. There are two steps in the proof. 1 st step: the contracts stated in Assumption 1 do not change the behavior of any type as compared to null contracts. The inefficient agent always gets zero rent, so he is indifferent between a null contract and any other contract that gives him zero. To check the incentives to deviate of the efficient type consider first the case of α = 0. Lemmas 5 and 6 establish that U 1 satisfies the IC int constraint. So, the possibility to get the same rent by mimicking the bad type will not change the behavior of the good type. If α = 0 and α > 0 the possibility for the good agent to get the same rent in the first period (by choosing the contract designed for him or mimicking the bad type) as he gets in the second period will not change his behavior. 2 nd step: given that the behavior of agents does not change, the profits of the principal are not affected by the choice of the contract for the type that does not accept it.
Proof of Lemma 6. If α = 1 the refusal of the first-period contract is off equilibrium. Lemma 1 says that q 2 is zero in this case (i.e. no rent for the good type). Therefore, in the first-period the good type accepts the contract with any positive rent. The principal's problem is then (14) without the last constraint; therefore, it is the standard adverse selection problem with probabilities ν and (1 − ν)α of the good and the bad type, respectively.
If 0 < α < 1 the bad type receives the first-best offer in the second period. By refusing the first-period contract the efficient agent will get an expected utility of δ ∆θ q F B P i:p i|b >0 p i|g . The principal's problem is then (14) with the last constraint replaced by (15) . If this constraint does not bind, we have the usual adverse selection problem. If it binds, U 1 = δ ∆θ q Proof of Proposition 3. Replace α with 1 − γ(1 − α) and rewrite the profit function (17) as:
The second-period quantities q i 2 and thus q 1 depend only on γ, therefore e V (γ, α, β, β) is linear in α.
To have the maximum of e V (γ, α, β, β) in both mixed strategies we need e V Rewrite it as
The expression in the brackets in the left-hand side is exactly e V 00 γα . So, at the point when e V 00 γα = 0 the right-hand must also be zero. If both sides equal to zero, then First, we establish the behavior of q 1 . From its definition we see that q 1 (α) is increasing in α and q 1 (0) = 0. Therefore, for α small q 1 (α) is less than δq F B P i:p i|b >0 p i|g and at some point it might become greater: When q 1 = δq F B P i:p i|b >0 p i|g this derivative clearly has this form. When q 1 = q 1 (α) we use the envelope theorem.
Since W (q 1 ) is a strictly increasing function of q 1 , the behavior of V This is the case of the breakpoint of W (q 1 ). When α < 1 the principal has to satisfy the IC int constraint of the good type, then q 1 is high so it is better to produce in the first period. But at α = 1 q 1 (1) is low so it is better to postpone the production. The principal wants to have α as close to 1 as possible but not 1.
d. There exists e α at which W (q 1 ) = δW (q F B ). For α < e α V 0 α is negative while for α > e α it is positive. V (1, α, β, β) has the minimum at α = e α and the maximum is at one of the ends, i.e. α is 1 or 0. (to get the middle term we used the same trick as in the case 2). This derivative is positive at α = 0, thus the maximum of principal's profits is not at α = 0. Then the subcases (b) and (d) do not exist. Therefore, the principal chooses between (1, 1) and (α, 0) (if (18) has solutions). In fact, Proposition 1 already establishes that in this case (1, 0) is dominated by (1, 1) .
Proof of Lemma 7. After Proposition 4 it is left to show that V (α, 0) < V (1, 1) (where α is possibly one) if there is no information arriving after the first period. In this case E g [q 2 ] = q 2 which is the second-best quantity when the respective probabilities of the good and the bad type are ν(1 − α) and 1 − ν.
V (α, 0, β, β) = νW (q (we continue to write (β, β) as the arguments even if they don't matter). The first inequality is the division by α + δ(1 − α) which is less than one. The other two are the same as in in the proof of Proposition 1. The first inequality is equality only when α = 1; the second one is when α = 0. One of them is always strict.
